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Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) is perhaps the most important French philosopher be-
tween Descartes and the Revolution of 1789. His synthesis of Cartesian elements and Au-
gustinianism in the last quarter of the seventeenth century had great influence on several 
generations of thinkers before the rationalism he represented was replaced by the new 
Lockian sensualism. There has been a European revival of interest in Malebranche in the 
last twenty years, centering around the first critical edition of his complete works, a task 
headed by the Belgian historian of philosophy André Robinet, and there are signs that 
American interest is growing as well with the recent publication of translations of two of 
his works (Malebranche 1980a, 1980b), and another monograph on his philosophy (Radner 
1978). 
Malebranche has not received much attention from historians of linguistics, although 
his only extended comments on language, dealing with how meaning is attached to words, 
have been treated in some detail in Robinet’s 1978 excellent survey of language theory in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Literary critics, on the other hand, often refer to 
his attack against rhetoric but seldom analyze it at length (France 1972, Tocanne 1978). My 
own interest in Malebranche began from just such references to his ideas on communica-
tion. As I looked into them further I realized that the literary historians had emphasized 
such psychological elements as the imagination and emotions in his theory of rhetoric at 
the expense of language as language; conversely, his ideas on language took on broader 
interest when situated in the larger perspective of his views on various forms of commu-
nication. 
Still, it must be admitted that language was not one of his central preoccupations, but 
then, as a reviewer of Robinet’s book remarks, philosophers in the seventeenth century did 
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not share the obsession with language of their twentieth-century successors (Hottois 1979: 
586). Rather Malebranche is best known today for two doctrines, occasionalism and vision 
in God. Occasionalism holds that the interactions in the world around us which we take to 
be examples of one thing causing another to happen are in fact deceiving. The causality 
that we observe is only apparent, for God reserves to himself all true power and efficacy. 
We have only observed an occasional cause. 
Vision in God applies this theory to human knowledge, and at the same time solves the 
problem in Cartesian philosophy of the mind’s interaction with the body. Descartes had 
posited that the mind and body are two radically different substances. His explanation of 
how these two distinct substances are joined in humans, and of how the mind and body 
interact did not satisfy even his disciples. Malebranche’s solution was to maintain that the 
mind is united, not only to the body but also to God. Since his doctrine of occasionalism 
makes God the only true cause, it became all the easier for him to locate the ultimate source 
of all essential knowledge in God himself rather than in the body or the mind. He will see 
that Malebranche’s ideas on communication depend greatly on this scheme. 
It becomes clear why language is not at the heart of his concerns if we examine his phil-
osophic project, reflected best in the title of his first and most famous book, La recherche de 
la vérité. This quest for truth is only satisfied in pure thought, in a realm where the thinker 
leaves behind all traces of the material world. In the Augustinian tradition, thought is in-
dependent of language: “La substance purement spirituelle de 1’âme humain participe au 
Verbe sans intermédiaire, dans une immédiation de pure lumière . . . La pensée donne la 
réplique exacte et muette de la vision du savoir dans la participation sans écart au Verbe” 
(Robinet 1978: 18–19). 
If Malebranche’s only concern had been to discover truth for himself, language would 
have been of little importance. Yet he was equally dedicated to communicating his method 
and findings to others, and in the tradition of Saint Augustine, it is precisely here that lan-
guage intervenes (Hottois 1979: 575). Remarks on language are, in fact, found scattered all 
through his works, especially where ever he reflects on communication. Thus, language, 
which at first seemed somewhat incidental to his central pursuit, becomes in the end rather 
significant. 
This paper examines the role of language in two opposing paradigms of communica-
tion. The first is found in his famous indictment of “la communication contagieuse des 
imaginations fortes” in La Recherche (I: 320). It is exemplified by the appeals to the imagi-
nation and emotions of the eloquence of Seneca, Tertullian, and Montaigne. The second 
form is best illustrated by his own dialogues; it is patterned on his recommendations for 
the discovery of truth which give priority to the mind’s ability to focus its attention on the 
Divine Reason. 
Examining one example of his strictures against what he considers false eloquence will 
give us a fair idea of the rationale behind his condemnation: “Il faut bien distinguer la force 
et la beauté des paroles, de la force et l’evidence des raisons. Il y a sans doute beaucoup de 
force, et quelque beauté dans les paroles de Seneque, mais il y a très peu de force et d’évi-
dence dans ces raisons. Il donne par la force de son imagination un certain tour à ses pa-
roles, qui touche, qui agite, et qui persuade par impression; mais il ne leur donne pas cette 
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netteté, et cette lumiére pure, qui éclaire et qui persuade par évidence” (I: 345). Male-
branche’s complaint is that such discourse is addressed to the imagination and emotions 
rather than the head. Reason is sidestepped by a variety of strategies. In some passages he 
mentions verbal devices like the cadence of prose, figures of speech, or literary ornaments. 
Other times, when stressing oral delivery, he adds tone of voice, gestures, and the general 
air and manner of the speaker. Any and all of these tricks of style or delivery are capable 
of distracting the listener from reasoned argument. 
Implicit behind this view is Malebranche’s adaptation of a good deal of Cartesian psycho-
physiology and epistemology. Indeed, it was upon reading Descartes’ treatise on the sub-
ject, De l’homme, that Malebranche was converted to the new philosophy. Descartes main-
tained that there is a radical separation between the extended world of matter and the 
spiritual world of thought. Humans are particularly susceptible to error because of their 
make-up as a union of these two dissimilar substances. All important truth—God’s exist-
ence, moral laws, and the essence of things—are known by the mind as clear and distinct 
ideas. However, the body is constantly feeding the mind information which lacks these 
two qualities. This information, which comes from the senses, must be distrusted because 
of its incomplete and hazy nature; it lacks the clarity and distinction which is the criterion 
of truth. But this is not to say that sense information is worthless; rather it is true only in 
regard to the relation of the objects of the senses to our bodies. Sense data tell us nothing 
about the essence of things in themselves because the senses have been given us by God 
chiefly for self-preservation, to warn us about impending dangers to the body. The discov-
ery of any ultimate truth is the task of the mental faculty called the “pure” understanding. 
The misfortune is that sense impressions have a stronger appeal for us than the more ab-
stract, clear, and distinct ideas of the understanding. These “pure” ideas remain on the 
surface of the mind, while sense data penetrate it deeply. The result is that those who 
would dedicate themselves to the pursuit of truth must be on guard not to be waylaid by 
sense knowledge. 
The mind’s weapon in this rear guard skirmish is its other chief faculty, the will. This 
faculty must maintain the judgment in a constant state of suspension until the understand-
ing is satisfied that clear and distinct ideas have been attained. At the same time, the will 
should focus the attention on the problem at hand, examining it from every side, as it 
searches out truth. Thus the will has a double task. On the one hand, it fights against error 
by suspending the judgment; on the other hand, it has the positive duty of maintaining the 
attention necessary to arrive at clear and distinct ideas. 
It is in this context that Malebranche’s attack on the contagious communication of strong 
imaginations must he understood. If he objects to stylistic devices which make a speech 
more pleasing to the ear, it is because this is an appeal to the sense of hearing. If he objects 
to a speaker’s reliance on gestures and facial expressions to persuade, it is because of the 
appeal to eyesight. If he attacks the use of the imagination, it is because the imagination is 
ultimately for him a form of sense perception—visualizing absent objects in the mind’s 
eye. In every case, he is objecting to appeals to the body rather than the mind, to the senses 
rather than the understanding. Given the attractiveness of sense perception, it is not a dif-
ficult task for an orator with a particularly strong or vivid imagination of his own to com-
municate his vision to his listeners, making them forget the voice of reason. 
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Against this model of faulty communication, communication which does not succeed 
in reaching the truth, Malebranche opposes a second kind, which incorporates his concept 
of vision in God. In the first model, the mind never attains truth because it is weighed 
down by its union with the body. In the second, the mind’s union with God is strengthened 
by the communication process. But communication is not quite the right word, if by it we 
mean that one person communicates directly with another. Rather the first is a moniteur, 
or assistant of the truth. In the measure that he succeeds in enlightening his fellows it is 
only by turning their attention toward God in whom all truth is seen. The first person is 
the occasional cause, or rather the attention he excites by means of his words is the occa-
sional cause; the true dialogue is not so much at the human level as between the humans 
and the Divine Reason, for whom the first person is only an intermediary. .Just how Male-
branche links the dialogue between humans to his theory of vision in God is clear in this 
description of the dialogue process: “Les paroles que Theodore prononce à mes oreilles 
m’avertissent donc en consequence des loix de l’union de l’ame et du corps, d’être attentif 
aux véritez qu’il découvre dans la souveraine Raison. Cela me tourne l’esprit du même 
côté que lui. Je voi ce qu’il voit, parce que je regarde où il regarde. Et par les paroles que je 
rends aux siennes, quoique les unes et les autres soient vides de sens, je m’entretiens avec 
lui, et je joüis avec lui d’un bien qui nous est commun à tous. Car nous sommes tous essien-
tiellement unis avec la Raison: tellement unis, que sans elle nous ne pouvons lier societé 
avec personne” (XII–XIII: 169). 
Up to this point I have been examining Malebranche’s ideas on communication in terms 
of his epistemology. While his concept of the operation of the mind remains an indispen-
sable background to his views on how humans communicate, we can gain additional in-
sights by examining them in terms of the role of language. For example, when Malebranche 
describes vision in God, the end-product of authentic communication between men, he 
uses the metaphor of speech. He speaks of attention as putting a series of questions to God 
(II: l94), and of the necessity of listening attentively to the voice of Divine Reason (XII–XIII: 
69). But this is only a manner of speaking. His Augustinianism is too strong for this con-
sultation of reason not to be wordless. As Robinet has put it, “Là, le rôle du langage est 
pour ainsi dire annulé” (1978: 165). 
The contrast between the verbal communication of the two human participants in dia-
logue and the nonverbal relationship with God is clear in the following passage which 
highlights the key points of his analysis of language: “Car quelque justes que soient ves 
expressions, quand vous me parlez et que je consulte la Raison, il se fait en même tems un 
bruit confus de deux réponses differentes, l’une sensible, et l’autre intelligible. Et le moin-
dre inconvenient qui en arrive, c’est que la réponse qui me frappe l’oreille partage la ca-
pacité de mon esprit, et en diminuë la vivacité et la penetration. Car il vous faut du tems 
pour prononcer vos paroles; mais toutes les réponses de la Raison sont éternelles et im-
muables. Elles ont toujours été dites, ou plûtôt elle se disent toujours sans aucune succes-
sion de tems; et quoiqu’il nous faille quelques momens pour les entendre, il ne lui en faut 
point pour les faire, parce qu’effectivement elles ne sont point faites. Elles sont éternelles, 
immuables, nécessaires” (XII–XIII: 89). First, human language involves the senses, while 
divine communication is purely “intelligible,” an affair of the understanding alone. Sec-
ond, human language is time-bound since utterances begin and end, while divine truths 
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are eternal. Finally divine truth is immutable, while human language changes over time 
and varies from culture to culture. Human language is thus not even a pale imitation of 
the communication men have with Divine Reason through vision in God. It is of a different 
order, and Malebranche declares that there is reason to think that after death, when hu-
mans will be liberated from the domination of the body, that language will no longer be 
necessary (I: 416). 
This last point shows how closely language is tied in Malebranche’s eyes to the mind’s 
union with the body: “. . . J’expérience nous apprenne, que nous ne pouvons pas immédi-
atement et par nous-mêmes déclarer nos pensées les uns aux autres, seulement par des 
paroles, ou par d’autres signes sensibles, ausquels nous avons attaché nos idées” (I: 415). 
Just as the body is joined to the mind, so words join a sensible sign with an idea. In its most 
legitimate role, language serves to “représenter les idées pures de l’esprit” (XI: l36; cf. XI: 
95), the clear and distinct ideas which the pure understanding perceives in God. Unfortu-
nately, language, along with mankind, has fallen on hard times as a consequence of origi-
nal sin: “leur langage est corrompu comme leur coeur” (XI: 199). As we discuss this 
linguistic corruption, we will see that it is the inevitable consequence of the human dual 
nature. 
In the course of this presentation of the weaknesses of verbal communication, it will be 
useful to compare it to another form of communication—not the wordless communication 
of the mind with the Divine Reason we have just mentioned—but a speaker’s gesture, 
mannerisms, and facial expressions, by which he expresses his feeling and interior dispo-
sitions. This “body language” is a component of what I have labeled the inauthentic model 
of communication, just as the wordless vision in God is a component of the more perfect 
form. Malebranche labels gestures and the like a “language naturel” because they repre-
sent directly and in a universal way the sentiments felt (XI: 255), while verbal language 
consists of an audible sign which is arbitrarily attached to an idea. It is this arbitrary char-
acter which is the first source of the potential disadvantages of language. Because there is 
no resemblance, no necessary relation between the idea and the sign that represents it, the 
word is harder for the mind to possess than a simple gesture (IV: l04). Malebranche dis-
cusses in some detail how this arbitrary link between sign and idea is reinforced; rather 
than treat this point here, I refer the reader to Robinet (1978: 162–64), who treats the matter 
thoroughly. 
The second potential disadvantage of verbal language stems from its association with 
the body through the senses. Given that the appeal of the senses is more attractive than the 
appeal of pure ideas, the word as sound often overpowers the word as meaning or idea. 
The cadence of prose, the harmony of a sentence—both elements which appeal to the ear—
often have more persuasive power than the ideas which the words are supposed to repre-
sent. This power is so great, in fact, that if a speech is beautiful enough, it can generate a 
feeling of persuasion in an audience without the audience ever being quite sure of what it 
has been persuaded (I: 345). In this respect, facial expressions and gestures are again more 
effective than words because the visual stimulation that they arouse is more gripping than 
the auditory stimulation of language. When such expressive delivery is combined with 
stylistic brilliance, an orator has a sure hold on the unreflecting majority of his listeners 
who are so captivated by the surface appeal to the senses that they never apply their reason 
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to the issue under discussion. It is of just such a seductive orator that Malebranche ex-
claims, “le don de la parole est le plus grand des talens” (III: 173–74). This absence of re-
flection in most humans makes for a mechanical kind of persuasion which transforms them 
into machines (XI: 205; 199). In contrast to the authentic form of communication in which 
we communicate indirectly with each other through the union of minds with God, here 
one body acts more or less directly on another. This mechanical persuasion never rises 
above the level of the senses to involve the reason since it depends chiefly on the sounds 
of words and the way in which they are delivered rather than their meaning. 
A word’s sound served as a barrier of sorts to authentic communication in the situation 
I have just described; in contrast, the third problem area associated with language stems 
from lack of precision in a word’s meaning. As we have seen, for Malebranche, words 
ideally are meant to represent clear and distinct ideas. However, ideas are, in fact, often 
hazy and confused, and the meanings of the words which represent them equivocal. The 
causes of the resulting ambiguity are multiple, but all interfere with language’s potential 
as an instrument for communicating the truth. 
First, some ideas are by their very nature hazy and confused. This is especially true of 
various sensations experienced by the body; heat, cold, colors, tastes, and the like. Such 
feelings concern only the body and have a unique quality for each individual (I: 453). It is 
only by conjecture that we assume that others have more or less the same sense experiences 
as our own. The consequence is a certain imprecision: “Or les hommes n’ayant leurs sen-
timens qu’à cause du corps, et leurs corps n’etant pas disposé en tous de la même manière, 
il arrive souvent que les mots sont équivoques” (I: 452–55). To illustrate his point that 
words cannot adequately represent sensations he cites the case of the blind to whom it is 
impossible to give “La moindre connoissance de ce que l’on entend par rouge, verd, jaune” 
by verbal means (I: 145). 
Popular usage is another source of lack of precision in language. Terms dealing with 
morality, where words like shame, love, and despair are often surrounded by a certain 
ambiguity furnish many examples. Malebranche classifies such words as “abridged ex-
pressions,” short-hand notations for several notions (II: 222). The abridgment itself is not 
to be condemned if it is only that—the combining of two clear and distinct ideas (II: 222), 
but too often we take it for granted that these ideas are clear simply because they are fa-
miliar (XI: 30; cf. XI: 74). 
Malebranche realizes that we are not required to speak with the precision of a philoso-
pher on all occasions. He notes that even Scripture uses what he considers imprecise lan-
guage since it is written for the mass of Christians rather than for the thinking elite (III: 
232–33). He is much less indulgent with professional writers of various sorts who aim at 
specialized audiences. For example, he criticizes scholastic theologians for what he consid-
ers their mental gymnastics, which he believes are based on the failure to clearly define 
terms (XVI: 73). 
On the other hand, Malebranche sees equivocation as less likely in body language. He 
believes that facial expressions, in particular, reveal in a direct and universal way a 
speaker’s feelings, and thus that it is much more difficult to deceive someone about our 
true sentiments using them than with words (XI: 255). 
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Ambiguity will cease to plague human language only “quand les hommes aimeront 
uniquernent la verité, alors ils prendront bien garde à ce qu’ils disent” (III: l73). That day 
will come, however, only when humans no longer depend on their bodies, that is to say, 
after their death (III: 174). Only then will language be purified, if it will be necessary at all. 
This is not to say, however, that Malebranche has no use for language. In this life it is the 
occasional cause by which we communicate with each other through the Divine Reason. If 
language is easily corrupted, it is because there is a striking parallel between language and 
the human dual nature. Just as the body and mind are absolutely distinct and dissimilar 
yet joined together, so the link between a word’s sound and its meaning is completely 
arbitrary (I: 213). Thus, it is not surprising that one can find both the best and the worst in 
human nature and human language. When properly used, verbal communication serves 
as a stimulus for the mind’s contact with the Divine Reason through vision in God; when 
abused, verbal language joins the natural language of gesture and facial expression in a 
mechanical persuasion which degrades humans into machines (cf. XI: 136). Such mechan-
ical persuasion is more powerful in the short run but because it is directed at the body 
rather than the understanding, no essential truth is communicated. The kind of dialogue 
which heightens the mind’s attention to the Divine Reason is a slower process, accessible 
perhaps only to a rational elite because it must make use of the impure instrument which 
is human language, but its results are more permanent and more satisfying. 
In conclusion, I hope that I have shown that Malebranche’s views on language are as 
important to understanding his notion of communication as his views on psychology and 
epistemology. I would only add that while I have not attempted to situate Malebranche in 
the development of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century language thought, it is to be 
hoped that specialists in historical linguistics will be encouraged by the rival of interest in 
him in literary and philosophic circles to reassess his role in the history of the theory of 
language. 
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